**TonUP Smart Contract** Audit Report

Fri May 24 2024











# **TonUP Smart Contract Audit Report**

# **1 Executive Summary**

# 1.1 Project Information

Description	A launchpad and staking project.	
Туре	Launchpad	
Auditors	TonBit	
Timeline	Thu May 23 2024 - Fri May 24 2024	
Languages	Tact	
Platform	Ton	
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Manual Review	
Source Code	https://github.com/nx-fi/tonup	
Commits	<u>c769ecc750a016491fde081e845531e360c25ded</u> <u>d923299211754e26959d1729592b67168813629a</u>	

# 1.2 Files in Scope

The following are the SHA1 hashes of the original reviewed files.

ID	File	SHA-1 Hash	
TLFP	contracts/tonup_launcher_fixed_pri ce.tact	09e301cf4b805fa4da1e03d6a8d88 c2e647c3386	
TWH	contracts/tonup_whitelist.tact	bfda38cd5334bec439bfdd98b46a 53691403218d	
TST	contracts/tonup_staking.tact	85c20e2037f73d6ea36ccc559e962 39cec72a177	
TTL	contracts/tonup_token_locker.tact	fc64e3e2c314f602e12b27b344ce4 759fc3c174a	

# 1.3 Issue Statistic

ltem	Count	Fixed	Acknowledged
Total	6	6	0
Informational	1	1	0
Minor	3	3	0
Medium	2	2	0
Major	0	0	0
Critical	0	0	0

# 1.4 TonBit Audit Breakdown

TonBit aims to assess repositories for security-related issues, code quality, and compliance with specifications and best practices. Possible issues our team looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Integer overflow/underflow by bit operations
- Number of rounding errors
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting
- Unchecked CALL Return Values

# 1.5 Methodology

The security team adopted the "Testing and Automated Analysis", "Code Review" strategy to perform a complete security test on the code in a way that is closest to the real attack. The main entrance and scope of security testing are stated in the conventions in the "Audit Objective", which can expand to contexts beyond the scope according to the actual testing needs. The main types of this security audit include:

### (1) Testing and Automated Analysis

Items to check: state consistency / failure rollback / unit testing / value overflows / parameter verification / unhandled errors / boundary checking / coding specifications.

#### (2) Code Review

The code scope is illustrated in section 1.2.

### (3) Audit Process

- Carry out relevant security tests on the testnet or the mainnet;
- If there are any questions during the audit process, communicate with the code owner
  in time. The code owners should actively cooperate (this might include providing the
  latest stable source code, relevant deployment scripts or methods, transaction
  signature scripts, exchange docking schemes, etc.);
- The necessary information during the audit process will be well documented for both the audit team and the code owner in a timely manner.

# 2 Summary

This report has been commissioned by TonUP to identify any potential issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the TonUP smart contract, as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. In this audit, we have utilized various techniques, including manual code review and static analysis, to identify potential vulnerabilities and security issues.

During the audit, we identified 6 issues of varying severity, listed below.

ID	Title	Severity	Status
TLF-1	Missing distribution_complete Check	Medium	Fixed
TLF-2	There May Be Unexpected Abort	Medium	Fixed
TLF-3	Missing Time Check	Minor	Fixed
TLF-4	Incorrect Event Emit	Minor	Fixed
TLF-5	Unintuitive Judgment Conditions	Minor	Fixed
TLF-6	Code Optimization	Informational	Fixed

# **3 Participant Process**

Here are the relevant actors with their respective abilities within the TonUP Smart Contract : **Admin** 

- The Admin can send message SetStakingConfig to set StakingConfig.
- The Admin can send message SetMetadata to set METADATA\_NAME.
- The Admin can send message enable claim to make self.config.reward\_is\_claimable true and claim function available.
- The Admin can send message disable claim false and claim function not available.
- The Admin can send message enable unstake to make self.config.unstake\_during\_reward\_period true and unstake function available.
- The Admin can send message AddReward to add new reward epoch configration.
- The Admin can send message withdraw dust to withdraw assets stucked in the contract.
- The Admin can send message RescueTokens to send assets that is not staking token wallet address from the contract.
- The Admin can send message SetLauncherConfig to set launch config.
- The Admin can send message SetMetadata to set metadata.
- The Admin can send message SetTokenWalletAddress to set self.token wallet address .
- The Admin can send message SetUpWalletAddress to set self.up\_wallet\_address.
- The Admin can send message AddDistributionPool to add new distribution pool.
- The Admin can send message DeleteDistributionPool to delete the distribution pool.
- The Admin can send message ModifyDistributionPool to modify the distribution pool.
- TThe Admin can send message ManualTransferNotification to increase self.tokens\_awaiting\_launch .
- The Admin can send message SetWhitelistContract to set the white list address.

- The Admin can send message validate to make self.config\_validated true.
- The Admin can send message finalize to refund any unsold tokens to the unsold token refund address.
- The Admin can send message distribute to distribute tons according to pool settings.
- The Admin can send message withdraw dust to withdraw assets stuck in contract.
- The Admin can send message RescueJetton to send assets that is not staking token wallet address from contract.
- The Admin can send message SetWhitelistConfig to set the white list config.
- The Admin can send message AddDataWriter to add data writer.
- The Admin can send message RemoveDataWriter to remove data writer.
- The Admin can send message BatchWhitelistUser to batch add/remove users to/from the whitelist.
- The Admin can send message WhitelistUserParticipateCommunication to return full amount to msg.owner or self.launcher .

#### User

- The User can send assets to specified wallet and wallet would send message JettonTransferNotification to stake.
- The User can send message Ustake to unstake assets.
- The User can send message claim to claim rewards.
- The User can send message Participate to participate in the launch.
- The User can send message claim to claim rewards.
- The User can send message refund to refund their tons in case launch failed.
- The User can send message withdraw to initiate a withdraw to the recipient.

# 4 Findings

# TLF-1 Missing distribution\_complete Check

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#465

### Descriptions:

The lack of checking of the distribution\_complete variable in the launch\_successful condition resulted in the distribute function being able to be called repeatedly.

### Suggestion:

It is recommended to add a check self.distribution\_complete != false in the self.launch\_successful condition.

#### Resolution:

# TLF-2 There May Be Unexpected Abort

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#502

### Descriptions:

In the withdraw dust function, the calculation of the dust\_to\_claim variable may result in an unexpected abort due to insufficient subtraction of myBalance because total\_ton\_contributed has been distributed and the amount of myBalance will be reduced.

### Suggestion:

It is recommended to add a check for the dust\_to\_claim .

#### Resolution:

# TLF-3 Missing Time Check

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#331

## Descriptions:

start\_time and end\_time are not checked in the SetLauncherConfig function.

# Suggestion:

It is recommended to add a check as:

require(phase\_config.start\_time >= config.end\_time, "Invalid claim start time");

### Resolution:

# TLF-4 Incorrect Event Emit

**Severity: Minor** 

Status: Fixed

### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#361,370

## Descriptions:

The event emit in the SetTokenWalletAddress function and the SetUpWalletAddress function does not match the function's functionality.

# Suggestion:

It is recommended to use coorrect event emit.

### Resolution:

# TLF-5 Unintuitive Judgment Conditions

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#577

### **Descriptions:**

In the conditional judgment of the claim function, here is:

require(self.total\_ton\_contributed >= self.config.min\_total\_ton, "Min TON limit not met");

But in the function finalize:

```
if (self.total_ton_contributed < self.config.min_total_ton) {
        self.launch_successful = false;
        tokens_to_refund = self.tokens_awaiting_launch;
    } else {
        self.launch_successful = true;
        tokens_to_refund = self.tokens_awaiting_launch - self.total_ton_contributed *
        self.config.tokens_per_ton / ton("1"); // Very unlikely to overflow (need 1e59 tokens)
    }
}</pre>
```

It has determined the size of these two values.

### Suggestion:

It is recommended to use self.launch\_successful to determine whether it is successful to finalize.

#### Resolution:

# TLF-6 Code Optimization

Severity: Informational

Status: Fixed

### Code Location:

contracts/tonup\_launcher\_fixed\_price.tact#590

## Descriptions:

When there are no new unlocks to be extracted( jetton\_claim\_amount - already\_claimed = 0 ), the transaction should be abort to avoid initiating multiple transactions.

# Suggestion:

It is recommended to add an assert when jetton\_claim\_amount - already\_claimed = 0.

### Resolution:

# **Appendix 1**

# Issue Level

- **Informational** issues are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or to optimize code that does not affect the overall functionality.
- **Minor** issues are general suggestions relevant to best practices and readability. They don't post any direct risk. Developers are encouraged to fix them.
- **Medium** issues are non-exploitable problems and not security vulnerabilities. They should be fixed unless there is a specific reason not to.
- **Major** issues are security vulnerabilities. They put a portion of users' sensitive information at risk, and often are not directly exploitable. All major issues should be fixed.
- **Critical** issues are directly exploitable security vulnerabilities. They put users' sensitive information at risk. All critical issues should be fixed.

# **Issue Status**

- **Fixed:** The issue has been resolved.
- Partially Fixed: The issue has been partially resolved.
- Acknowledged: The issue has been acknowledged by the code owner, and the code owner confirms it's as designed, and decides to keep it.

# **Appendix 2**

# Disclaimer

This report is based on the scope of materials and documents provided, with a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete and do not include all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your own risk. A report does not imply an endorsement of any particular project or team, nor does it guarantee its security. These reports should not be relied upon in any way by any third party, including for the purpose of making any decision to buy or sell products, services, or any other assets. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, WE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS REPORT, ITS CONTENT, RELATED SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, AND YOUR USE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NOT INFRINGEMENT.

